Monthly Plan

Access everything in the JPASS collection Read the full-text of every article Download up to 10 article PDFs to save and keep $19.50/month


You are watching: What characterizes the present political era that began in 1968

Yearly Plan

Access everything in the JPASS collection Read the full-text of every article Download up to 120 article PDFs to save and keep $199/year
*

American political institutions were founded upon the Madisonian assumption of vigorous, self-sustaining political competition between the legislative and executive branches. Congress and the President would check and balance each other; officeholders would defend the distinct interests of their different institutions; ambition would counteract ambition. That is not how American democracy turned out. Instead, political competition and cooperation along relatively stable lines of policy and ideological disagreement quickly came to be channeled not through the branches of government, but rather through an institution the Framers could imagine only dimly but nonetheless despised: political parties. Few aspects of the founding generation"s political theory are now more clearly anachronistic than their vision of legislative-executive separation of powers. Yet few of the Framers" ideas continue to be taken as literally or sanctified as deeply by courts and constitutional scholars as the passages about interbranch relations in Madison"s Federalist 51. This Article reenvisions the law and theory of separation of powers by viewing it through the lens of party competition. In particular, it points out that during periods - like the present - of cohesive and polarized political parties, the degree and kind of competition between the legislative and executive branches will vary significantly and may all but disappear, depending on whether party control of the House, Senate, and Presidency is divided or unified. The practical distinction between party-divided and party-unified government thus rivals, and often dominates, the constitutional distinction between the branches in predicting and explaining interbranch political dynamics.


The Harvard Law Review publishes articles by professors, judges, and practitioners and solicits reviews of important recent books from recognized experts. Each issue also contains pieces by student editors. Published monthly from November through June, the Review has roughly 2,000 pages per volume. All articles--even those by the most respected authorities--are subjected to a rigorous editorial process designed to sharpen and strengthen substance and tone. The November issue contains the Supreme Court Foreword (usually by a prominent constitutional scholar), the faculty Case Comment, twenty-five Case Notes (analyses by third-year students of the most important decisions of the previous Supreme Court Term), and a compilation of Court statistics. The February issue features the annual Developments in the Law project, an in-depth treatment of an important area of the law.




See more: If A Simple Machine Provides An Increased Output Force, What Happens To The Output Distance?

Founded in 1887 by future Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis, the Harvard Law Review is an entirely student-edited journal that is formally independent of the Harvard Law School. Approximately ninety student editors make all editorial and organizational decisions and, together with a professional business staff of four, carry out day-to-day operations. Aside from serving as an important academic forum for legal scholarship, the Review is designed to be an effective research tool for practicing lawyers and students of the law. The Review also provides opportunities for its members to develop their own editing and writing skills. All student writing is unsigned, reflecting the fact that many members of the Review, in addition to the author and supervising editor, make a contribution to each published piece.